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PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL TO
RECOVER PENSION PAYMENTS:
IT'S TIME TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE
NELLA DISANTO*

INTRODUCTION

John Smith (Smith), who has worked for XYZ Corporation for
forty years, is close to retiring from the company. Throughout his
employment, Smith contributed to the corporation's' pension fund.2
Unfortunately, due to recent changes in the market, the
corporation is suffering from economic hardship and cannot pay all
* J.D. Candidate, June 2000. The Author wishes to thank her family for
their continued support and understanding. The Author appreciates and is
grateful to Professor Kathryn Kennedy of The John Marshall Law School for
her invaluable assistance throughout the writing and editing process involved
with this Comment. The Author also wishes to thank Professor John Ingram
of The John Marshall Law School for sharing his enthusiasm and joy for
writing.
1. See generally United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142
F. 247, 254-55 (E.D. Wis. 1905) (discussing the fundamental principles of
corporations). Corporations can be described as "an artificial person, created
by law as the representative of those persons, natural or artificial, who
contribute to and become the holders of shares in the property entrusted to it
for a common purpose." Id. (citations omitted).
2. See generally Williams v. Wright, 927 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1991)
(discussing the characteristics of employee pension plans); JEFFREY D.
MAMORsKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: ERISA AND BEYOND 1-2 (1999) (noting
the framework and basics of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA)). Retirement and pension plans are used interchangeably
throughout this Comment, and are defined by ERISA as a:
plan, fund, or program.., established or maintained by an employer or
by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its
express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan,
fuid or program:
(1) provides retirement income to employees, or
(2) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to
the termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the
method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of
calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing
benefits from the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1998). Simply speaking, a pension plan is an
agreement where an employer makes predetermined contributions to a fund
that will be disbursed to employees upon retirement from the company.
MAMORSKY, supra, at 1-3.
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of its financial obligations. The corporation, in particular, has not
made any payments to its pension fund. Smith and the other
employees want to pierce the corporate veil' and hold its
shareholders
liable
for
the
now-delinquent
payment
disbursements from the pension plan. The employees are seeking
to hold only those shareholders liable who have taken an active
and visible role in the corporation.
Smith and the other employees are blue-collar workers.
Thus, the contributions they made to the pension plan are critical,
and in most cases will be their only source of income at retirement.
The employees base their right to pierce the corporate veil on
provisions contained in the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),4 which provides a general
framework addressing situations when an employee can bring a
lawsuit against an employer. In Smith's situation, it is unlikely
that the employees will prevail on their claim, because currently
shareholders are generally protected from corporate debt,
especially ERISA debt.'
Although the scenario presented above is fictitious, the
problem presented by the situation is very real. With the
increased fear of not having sufficient income for retirement,
individuals are investing more of their salary in pension funds
offered by their employers. 6 The growth of pension investing is
sprouting concern about who can be held liable for pension
payments once payments to and from a plan become delinquent.7
Given the seriousness of this situation and the detrimental effect
on retiring employees, a general plan and guidelines to deal with
this situation must be created.
The purpose of this Comment is to address the issues that
arise when corporations become delinquent in funding and
disbursing pension funds. The purpose of this Comment is also to
provide a guideline for employees to use when attempting to
recover these delinquent distributions from individuals other than
their employers.
Part I of this Comment discusses the
relationship between the corporate structure and piercing the
corporate veil, while also providing background information on

3. See discussion infra Part I.B and notes 27-45 for a definition of and
background information about piercing the corporate veil.
4. See discussion infra Part I.C and notes 46-60 for background
information about ERISA.
5. See discussion infra Part L.A and notes 11-26 for information about the
concept of a shareholder's limited liability.
6. See generally MARTIN WALD & DAVID E. KENTY, ERISA: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 1-6 (Schnader et al. eds., 1991) (noting the growth in
popularity of retirement plans).
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (addressing the overall expansion of
contributions to pension plans).

20001

Piercingthe CorporateVeil

ERISA.' Part II analyzes the courts' inconsistent treatment of
actions seeking to pierce the corporate veil in ERISA contexts.
Part III proposes ERISA be amended to provide an outline of
specific elements that must be present in order for an employee to
bring a piercing the corporate veil action against shareholders.
Such an amendment would foster uniformity and consistency with
the policies underlying ERISA.9

I.

THE STRUCTURE AND PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING CORPORATIONS
AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS

The ability to pierce the corporate veil and remove limited
liability is a fundamental principle and an essential part of
business law.1"
Section A discusses the corporate structure.
Section B discusses and provides information regarding the theory
of piercing the corporate veil.
Section C provides general
background information about ERISA.
A. The CorporateStructure
The corporate entity is the predominate structure used in this
country to operate a business. 1 A corporation can be described as
a continuous series of contracts between the management and
shareholders of the corporation. 2 These contracts may be subject
to regulatory control depending on how the business was
incorporated. 3 A state has the right to regulate a business that
incorporates within its borders. 4
8. See Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Intersection of State
Corporation Law and Employee Compensation Programs: Is it Curtainsfor
Veil Piercing?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1059, 1065-89 (1996) (discussing in detail
multiple aspects of ERISA and the concepts of limited liability and corporate
veil piercing).
9. See discussion infra Part I.C and notes 46-60 for an overview of the
policies underlying ERISA.
10. See generally Rockney v. Blohorn, 877 F.2d 637, 642 (8th Cir. 1989)
(emphasizing the critical role that limited liability plays in business law); Ira
S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968)
(discussing the credibility behind limited liability in an agency context).
11. See

generally HENRY

N.

BUTLER

&

LARRY

E. RIBSTEIN,

THE

CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION vii (1995) (discussing the popularity
and advantages of conducting a business as a corporation). The other forms
that a business may take include "partnerships, limited liability companies,
sole proprietorships and joint ventures, and non-firm, relational contracts,
such as franchises and long-term supply contracts." Id. at 4.
12. See id. at 7 (providing various theories relating to the formation of a
corporation).
The description presented is the contractual theory of
corporations. Id.
13. Id. at 19.
This statement describes the concession theory of
corporations. Id. The concession theory suggests that a corporation does not
consist of normal, routine contracts, but special contracts that are subject to
direct governmental control. Id. at 18.
14. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 83-84 (1975) (discussing the permissibility
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Regardless of the reasons for forming a corporation, the
corporation is subject to the laws of the state in which it is
incorporated."
The corporation's officers decide what state to
incorporate in, and this decision is based on which state has laws
most compatible with the corporation's business purpose and
objective.'8 In order to incorporate a business, the initial step is to
file the articles of incorporation.
Articles of incorporation set
forth primarily the name and purpose of the corporation and must
be filed with the Secretary of State or other designated office."
Regardless of how the articles of incorporation read, the type of
work performed, or where a business is incorporated, the
corporation must maintain an existence independent from its
shareholders." This separate existence limits the shareholder's
responsibility to pay off delinquent balances to corporate
creditors."
21
Corporations are essentially formed to provide investors
with limited liability.2 Limited liability protects an investor from
of states imposing their laws and authority on corporations).
15. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 11, at 107 (discussing the
regulations that govern corporations). See also Cort, 422 U.S. at 84 (stating
that states have the authority to regulate corporations because "[c]orporations
are creatures of state law.").
16. See GEORGE C. SEWARD & W. JOHN NAUSS, JR., BASIC CORPORATE
PRACTICE 27-31 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing the considerations that must be
addressed when incorporating a business).
See generally FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

CORPORATE LAW 6-7 (1991) (providing an example of the analysis used by
corporate officers in selecting the state of incorporation).
Despite the
corporation's primary place of business, many corporations incorporate in
Delaware due to the state's favorable corporate laws. HARRY G. HENN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
138 (2d ed. 1970). In fact, nearly "one-third of the corporations listed on the
New York Stock Exchange are incorporated in Delaware." Id.
17. See generally HENN, supra note 16, at 199-200 (listing the disclosures
and other information required in the articles of incorporation).
18. Id. at 197. See also 15 U.S.C. § 681 (1998) (discussing the statutory
requirements for proper incorporation of a corporation).
19. See Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 415 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980) (discussing the importance of not commingling corporate and
shareholder activities).
20. See Lin Hanson, Corporate Limited Liability Certainly Has Its Limits,

CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 1, 1992, at 5 (stressing the importance of
individuals remaining removed from the daily operations of a corporation).
21. See generally Gallagher,415 N.E.2d at 563 (noting that no requirement
exists regarding the minimum amount of investors necessary to form a
corporation, but corporations are generally owned by several investors). See
generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 1 (providing useful
information about how an individual becomes an investor). Investors in a
corporation are called shareholders. Id. A shareholder usually invests money
in the corporation in return for an ownership percentage. Id.
22. See EATERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 11 (analyzing the
benefits shareholders receive from limited liability).
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losing more than the amount of capital initially invested in the
corporation.' Thus, a shareholder's personal assets not invested
in the corporation are protected from creditors, despite the threat
of corporate bankruptcy and the reality that creditors may never
receive their money.2 A corporation has a persona of its own,
independent from that of corporate investors; this distinction
prevents investors from using their personal assets to pay for
corporate debt.'
To bypass this obstacle, however, creditors
attempt to obtain their money by piercing the corporate veil.26
B. Piercingthe Corporate Veil: What Does it Mean?
Piercing the corporate veil is a means by which a corporate
creditor may obtain a shareholder's personal assets to pay for an
outstanding balance owed by the corporation.27 Limited liability
represents the veil that creditors want to remove, so that a
23. Id. at 55. Generally, an individual is responsible for corporate debt only
if the debt results from the individual's wrongful conduct, or if the assumption
of responsibility is documented in the corporation's charter. Id. The
advantages of limited liability and reasons why stockholders insist on it are
that limited liability:
decreases the need to monitor agents [and] ... reduces the costs of
monitoring other shareholders ....
[Bly promoting free transfer of
shares, limited liability gives managers incentives to act efficiently[,I ...
makes it possible for market prices to impound additional information
about the value of firms[,] ... allows more efficient diversification...
and] facilitates optimal investment decisions.
Id. at 41-42. See generally Ted Harrison Oil Co. v. Dokka, 617 N.E.2d 898,
900-02 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (suggesting that incorporators can purposely select
one corporate structure over another in an effort to limit the personal liability
of investors).
24. See Gonzalez v. Progressive Tool & Die Co., 455 F. Supp. 363, 366
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (discussing that creditors of a financially troubled business
generally cannot obtain the shareholder's personal assets in an attempt to
satisfy a corporate debt).
25. See Jacobson v. Buffalo Rock Shooters Supply, Inc., 664 N.E.2d 328, 331
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (stressing the importance of maintaining individuality
between corporations and shareholders). See also Stap v. Chicago Aces Tennis
Team, Inc., 379 N.E.2d 1298, 1301 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (discussing the
detrimental consequences of a corporation and investor appearing to exist as
one being). But see HENN, supra note 16, at 403 (noting that contrary to the
generally accepted notion of limited shareholder liability, New York and
Wisconsin hold shareholders personally liable for compensation owed to
employees regardless of the amount of money they invested in the
corporation).
26. See Gonzalez, 455 F. Supp. at 366 (stating that creditors may, in limited
situations, recover outstanding corporate balances by holding shareholders
personally liable).
27. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 54 (discussing in great
detail the concept of piercing the corporate veil). Theoretically, the threat of
incurring personal liability serves to prevent corporate personnel from
engaging in risky activities that would cause a reduction of corporate assets
into negative figures. Id. at 60.
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Once exposed, the
shareholder's personal assets are exposed.'
assets must be used to pay off corporate debt.' The protection
provided to investors through limited liability is ignored if that
protection infringes any rights belonging to an individual, or,
theoretically speaking, if the corporation is a mask meant to hide
the fact that the shareholders, and not the officers, are running
the corporation.' ° Courts are prone to pierce the corporate veil in
these situations to prevent an injustice.31
In determining whether investors should incur responsibility
to pay corporate debts, courts initially consider whether corporate
and individual identities are identical and whether the lack of
different identities causes injury to a creditor. 2 Courts that
28. See generally Rockney v. Blohorn, 877 F.2d 637, 642 (8th Cir. 1989)
(suggesting that the corporate form serves to protect a shareholder's personal
assets).
29. Id.

30. See generally Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 415 N.E.2d 560, 56465 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (suggesting that shareholders cannot deceive creditors
without assuming responsibility for their actions).
31. See Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417
U.S. 703, 713 (1974) (rationalizing and discussing the theory of piercing the
corporate veil arising from improper shareholder activity that results in an
injustice). The theory of corporate veil piercing is justified because:
the corporate form may be disregarded in the interests of justice where
it is used to defeat an overriding public policy [and] ... [wihere equity
would preclude the shareholders from maintaining the action in their
own right.... The principal beneficiary of any recovery and [the
corporation are] estopped from complaining of petitioners' alleged
wrongs, [and] cannot avoid the command of equity through the guise of
proceeding in the name of... corporations which it owns and controls.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Hystro Prod., Inc. v. MNP Corp., 18 F.3d 1384,
1390 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that in an effort to promote fairness, courts will
hold shareholders liable for corporate liabilities, especially when shareholders
engage in improper acts apart from the nonpayment of debt); Craig Hukill,
Labor and the Supreme Court: Significant Issues of 1992-1996, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Jan. 1997, at 13 (stating that courts may impose liability on
shareholders in an effort to promote equity and fairness).
32. See Gallagher,415 N.E.2d at 564 (discussing the factors that must be
analyzed in veil piercing cases). The following excerpt provides additional
insight into the critical factors used by courts to decide whether to impose
corporate debt on shareholders:
The decision to disregard the corporate entity does not generally rest on
a single factor but involves the consideration of many factors such as[:]
inadequate capitalization, failure to issue stock, failure to observe

corporate formalities, nonpayment of dividends, insolvency of the debtor
corporation at the time, non-functioning of other officers or directors,
absence of corporate records and whether in fact the corporation is only
a mere faqade for the operation of the dominant stockholders; in
addition, in the absence of fraud, the particular situation must generally

present an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness.
Id. (citing 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.3 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990)). The most
important factor in analyzing the propriety of the relationship between the

20001

Piercingthe CorporateVeil

shareholder behavior after initial
suspect inappropriate
consideration of the situation often narrow the analysis and look
at the specifics of the situation by using typical veil piercing
tests.' The typical veil piercing tests include:
(1) the alter ego, or mere instrumentality test, requiring that the
subsidiary be completely under the control and domination of the
parent;
(2) the fraud or wrong or injustice test, requiring that the
defendant parent's conduct in using the subsidiary have been
somehow unjust, fraudulent, or wrongful towards the plaintiff; and
(3) the unjust loss or injury test, requiring that the plaintiff
actually have suffered some harm as a result of the conduct of the
defendant parent.'
These tests are strictly and narrowly applied because of courts'
hesitation to pierce the corporate veil.'
Limited liability is undoubtedly removed once the activities of
a corporation and stockholder become intricately intertwined,
ultimately eliminating the separate individualities.36
The
rationale for holding a shareholder liable in such a situation is
that the shareholder acts as an alter ego of the corporation.37 This
corporation and a shareholder is the initial funding or capitalization of a
corporation. Id. See generally Suzanne C. Pysher, Tenth Circuit Survey:
Commercial Law Survey, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 873, 882 n.101 (1994)
(discussing both the factors necessary to pierce the corporate veil and the alter
ego doctrine).
33. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 1.6 (CCH 1991).

Courts look for obvious signals and indicators that the corporate entity and
shareholders are no longer distinct. Hanson, supra note 20, at 5. A company
not performing typical or expected corporate functions due to shareholder
involvement is an example of an obvious signal, and is a sufficient basis from a
court's perspective to impose liability on the investor. Id. See generally Muir
& Schipani, supra note 8, at 1083-89 (discussing piercing tests under state and
federal law).
34. PRESSER, supra note 33, at 1.33. See generally Chicago Dist. Council of
Carpenters Pension Fund v. Sunshine Carpet Serv., 866 F. Supp. 1113, 1116
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (providing the criteria that must be used in evaluating veil
piercing cases).
35. See Jacobson v. Buffalo Rock Shooters Supply, 664 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996) (addressing the general acceptance of veil piercing by courts);
see also Mark A. Olthoff, Beyond the Form - Should The Corporate Veil Be
Pierced?, 64 UMKC L. REV. 311, 312-19 (1995) (analyzing what factors must
be present to bring a cause of action to pierce the corporate veil).
36. See Ditty v. Checkrite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1335-36 (D. Utah 1997)
(discussing the concept of limited liability and what circumstances will remove
that protection).
37. See Chicago Dist. Council of CarpentersPension Fund, 866 F. Supp. at
1115-16 (illustrating the factors that indicate when an alter ego problem
exists). See also Bernard G. Helldorfer, Recent Developments Under The
National Labor Relations Act, 41 BUS. LAW. 1122, 1122 (1986) (noting the
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rationale is also known as "the alter ego doctrine"' and is one test
used to impose an obligation upon shareholders to pay for
corporate debt.39
Determining the applicability of the alter ego doctrine in a
case consists of a three-part analysis. ° First, courts analyze the
extent to which a shareholder acknowledges the existence of an
independent corporation, separate from the shareholder.41 Second,
courts investigate whether a shareholder engaged in any
fraudulent activity with the corporation. 42 Finally, courts evaluate
the consequences and harm caused to creditors if limited liability
is preserved.43 Courts generally will not pierce the corporate veil
unless injustice results or public welfare is jeopardized." ERISA
analyzes these policy considerations in light of the role they play
in pension plans.'5
C. ERISA Fundamentals
Determining the propriety of imposing liability on
shareholders for business debt becomes more difficult when both
increase in popularity of using the alter ego doctrine to impose liability on
individuals).
38. See Pysher, supra note 32, at 882 n.103 (stating that the alter ego
doctrine is one theory creditors can use to reach a shareholder's assets). The
alter ego doctrine applies when an individual makes corporate decisions and
uses the corporation as a means of carrying out personal business. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Holcomb v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 120 B.R. 35, 39 (M.D.N.C.
1990) (applying a three-part analysis for use with the instrumentality theory
of the alter ego doctrine).
41. See, e.g., Stap v. Chicago Aces Tennis Team, Inc., 379 N.E.2d 1298,
1303 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (illustrating shareholder behavior that ignores a
separate corporate existence). To fully understand the theory of alter ego, the
following definition is helpful:
The concept of disregarding the corporate existence and imposing
liability personally upon the real parties to a transaction is well
established ... where the director or officer is the alter ego of the
corporation, that is, where there is such unity of interest and ownership
that the separateness of the individual and [the] corporation has ceased
to exist, and the facts are such that an adherence to the fiction of
separate existence of the corporation would sanction a fraud or promote
injustice, such director or officer will be held liable for obligations of the
corporation.
Id. at 1301-02 (citing People ex rel. Scott v. Pintozzi, 277 N.E.2d 844, 851-52
(1971)).
42. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 (1998) (providing a
scenario that demonstrates improper shareholder activity).
43. See Freeman v. Complex Computing Co., 119 F.3d 1044, 1052-53 (2d
Cir. 1997) (emphasizing that the harm suffered by an individual must be
caused by the shareholder to permit veil piercing).
44. Estate of Wallen v. Donat, 633 N.E.2d 1350, 1357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
45. See ALAN P. WOODRUFF, ERISA LAW ANSWER BOOK 1-2, 8-2 (1997)
(explaining the fundamental policy behind ERISA).
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the corporation and pension plan cannot meet financial
obligations. Retirement benefit plans are governed by ERISA."
ERISA strives to protect the money that both employees and
employers contribute to pension plans.4 ERISA prevents blatant
misuse and deprivation of retirement funds by company
management and shareholders."
To apply the provisions of
ERISA as the drafters intended, the statute must be broadly
interpreted to protect contributions and ensure disbursement of
pension funds.4 9
At retirement, employees expect to receive payments from the
pension plan to which the employees and employer made
contributions. 5° However, an employee may not receive payment if
46. Id. at 1-2.

See STEPHEN R. BRUCE, PENSION CLAIMS RIGHTS AND

OBLIGATIONS 4 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that ERISA's provisions apply to all
retirement plans created by business owners, management or associations
that influence and engage in a trade or profession); THOMAS J. GRIFFITH,
CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO ERISA 1.002 (1998) (discussing in great
detail the structure and general scheme of ERISA). ERISA is broken down
into four titles, each containing individual provisions:
(1) Title I contains important provisions concerning reporting and
disclosure requirements,....
(2) Title II contains tax provisions that amended the Internal Revenue
Code (Code) of 1954,....
(3) Title III... contains specific government rules for implementing
ERISA, [and] ...
(4) Title IV... protects the rights and benefits of pension plan
participants during plan terminations ....
[This title] creates a
government insurance program administered by the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).
Id.
47. WOODRUFF, supra note 45, at 8-2. ERISA was created and enacted to:
(1) Guarantee that if a worker has been promised a benefit upon
retirement - and he or she has fulfilled whatever conditions are
required to obtain that benefit - he or she will in fact receive it [and]
(2) [Ensure] that employees and their beneficiaries are not deprived of
anticipated retirement benefits by the termination of pension plans
before sufficient funds [are] accumulated in the plans.
Id.
48. See BRUCE, supra note 46, at 2 (noting that ERISA attempts to prevent
employers from deliberately depriving employees of pension contributions
made to a plan during employment).
49. See Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir.
1984) (discussing the protection ERISA provides to employees). See also Kross
v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that
ERISA's provisions are to be liberally construed and interpreted).
50. See BRUCE, supra note 46, at 249 (detailing the timing of pension
distributions). Unless an employee elects to defer receipt of retirement
benefits, money in the fund must be disbursed before "the 60th day after the
end of the 'plan year' during which the later of these events occurs[:]"
(1) The participants attain age 65, or any earlier normal retirement age
specified under the plan,
(2) The participant passes his or her tenth anniversary of the
commencement of participation in the plan, or
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the plan lacks sufficient assets to distribute funds, or if the
employer decides to terminate the plan.5'
An employer can
terminate a plan if careful analysis of the plan's financial
statements reveals a strong indication of either current or future
insolvency.52
Obviously, employees become disgruntled at the prospect of
not receiving retirement payments, and as a consequence, they
analyze ERISA to determine what cause of action' they can bring
against the corporation and related parties to recover payments.5
ERISA must be analyzed because in the realm of pension plans,
this statute discloses the rights and responsibilities of each
individual involved in the pension plan. 5 In an attempt to obtain
delinquent retirement payments, employees attempt to hold
(3) The participant terminates from service with the employer.
Id.
51. See generally WALD & KENTY, supra note 6, at 319-29 (providing
reasons that may prevent disbursement of funds).

52. BRUCE, supra note 46, at 591. Under ERISA, an employer may file for a
distress termination. Id. In order to qualify as a "distress termination," the
plan's current financial position must make it nearly impossible to continue
operating the plan. Id. at 592. The possible categories for a distress
termination include situations in which a corporation:
(1) Has filed, or has had filed against it, a petition seeking liquidation

under the federal bankruptcy code or any similar state law;
(2) Has filed, or has had filed against it, a petition seeking
reorganization under the federal bankruptcy code or any similar state
law, with the bankruptcy court having approved a plan termination

based on determinations that unless the plan is terminated [the plan
sponsor and other members of the same controlled group (a)] will be
unable to pay all its debts pursuant to a plan of reorganization and [(b)]
will be unable to continue in business outside the chapter 11 [sic]
reorganization process; or
(3) Demonstrates to the satisfaction of the PBGC that it is unable to pay
debts when due and to continue in business unless the plan is
terminated, or that it is incurring unreasonably burdensome pension
costs solely as a result of a decline in the active work force covered by all
plans maintained by the contributing sponsor.
Id. Terminating a pension plan exposes the employer to the risk of having to
compensate the fund for any resulting deficiencies. Id.
53. See generally Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 353 (1996) (discussing
the possible recourses employees can take to recover delinquent pension
payments and the likelihood of recovery). Employees can sue a corporation
based on a breach of the terms that created the pension plan. Id. An
employee cannot bring a lawsuit premised solely on veil piercing. Id. at 354.
For a discussion of the Peacock v. Thomas case, see Muir & Schipani, supra
note 8, and Supreme Court Bars Federal Lawsuit Based on Alter Ego Doctrine
Against Shareholder of a Corporation Liable for Breaching Its ERISA
Fiduciary Duties, 5 ERISA Litig. Rep. (Aspen L. & Bus.) 1, 2-6 (Apr. 1996)
[hereinafter ERISA Litig. Rep.].
54. See generally GRIFFITH, supra note 46, at 1.039 (noting the legal actions
employees can bring to recover pension payments).
55. See generally BRUCE, supra note 46, at 2-3 (discussing the applicability
of ERISA to employment and pension law).
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shareholders personally liable.5 However, no provision specifically
exists in ERISA that permits or deals with veil piercing.
ERISA does not explicitly allow the elimination of corporate
limited liability for the sole purpose of collecting pension payments
from a shareholder.'
ERISA places primary liability on
employers.59 The word "employer" in an ERISA context does not
include, nor is it intended to include shareholders, unless the
shareholders assume the role of employer by participating in too
many corporate activities.' Currently, each court interprets and
analyzes the policies surrounding veil piercing and ERISA
differently when deciding delinquent pension distribution cases,
which creates a lack of uniformity among pension plans.
II. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM'S CURRENT TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE
ACTIONS TO RECOVER DELINQUENT CONTRIBUTIONS

Similar to any complex issue, courts lack consistency in the
analysis and resolution of veil piercing cases arising from ERISA
disputes.
Section A discusses the reasons that protect
shareholders from liability.
Section B provides the counteranalysis and a discussion of reasons supporting corporate veil
piercing.
A. Reasons Rejecting the Proprietyof Veil Piercing
Shareholder liability for corporate debt is not a novel issue for
the courts, since decisions regarding this concept date back to the
late 1800s.6 ' In an ERISA context, courts, albeit not consistently,

56. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Buczynski, 40 F.3d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 1994)
(offering an analysis of the factors creditors should consider when attempting

to hold a shareholder liable for corporate debt).
57. Peacock, 516 U.S. at 354.
58. See generally Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v.

Sunshine Carpet Serv., 866 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 (N.D. II. 1994) (suggesting
that Congress did not intend to hold shareholders accountable for pension
fund liabilities).

59. See generally Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Union
(Independent) Pension Fund v. Century Motor Freight, Inc., 125 F.3d 526, 528
(7th Cir. 1997) (reiterating the requirement of employers to make
contributions to the corporation's retirement plan).
60. See Solomon v. R.E.K. Dress, 670 F. Supp. 96, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(analyzing ERISA to determine the ability, if any, of employees imposing
liability on shareholders for pension obligations). ERISA defines an employer
as "any person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of
an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan; and includes a group or
association of employers acting for an employer in such capacity." 29 U.S.C. §
1002(5) (1998). See also Laborers' Pension Fund v. Litgen Concrete Cutting &
Coring Co., 709 F. Supp. 140, 142 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (discussing the
characterization of employers and their liability for contributions to a
retirement fund).
61. See, e.g., Flour City Nat'l Bank v. Wechselberg, 45 F. 547, 550 (E.D.
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have refused to impose liability on shareholders based on the
courts' interpretation of the statute.'2 Subsection One examines
the courts' interpretation of Congress' intent concerning the
payment of ERISA obligations.
Subsection Two discusses
mechanisms created by the courts to guard against imposing
liability on undeserving third parties.
1. Drafter's Vision RegardingERISA Liability
Courts reluctantly hold investors liable for corporate debt
because ERISA does not explicitly permit such a cause of action.'
In fact, documentation written by Congress directly stating that it
intended to hold individuals liable for ERISA debt does not exist.'
Employees bypass this technicality by premising a cause of action
against an individual for delinquent contributions on 29 U.S.C. §
5026 of ERISA.6 Under section 502, employees can bring a cause
of action to determine and uphold their rights and benefits arising
under the pension plan. 7 Employees manipulate that section to
mean that since they have a right to collect pension payments,
they also have a right to bring a cause of action to collect
Wis. 1891) (addressing whether a creditor can obtain a judgment for past due
corporate balances from a shareholder).
62. See, e.g., Glover v. S.D.R. Cartage Co., 681 F. Supp. 1293, 1296 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (finding that creditors are unlikely to succeed in a cause of action for
delinquent ERISA payments against a shareholder who does not control the

corporation).
63. MICHAEL J. CANAN & WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, EMPLOYEE FRINGE AND
WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS 518-19 (1998 ed. 1998). See ERISA Litig. Rep.,
supra note 53, at 4 (discussing whether a specific provision of ERISA must be
violated in order to bring a cause of action against individuals who are not
employers).
64. See Canario v. Byrnes Express & Trucking Co., 644 F. Supp. 744, 750
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting the absence of any documentation suggesting that
shareholders should be held liable for outstanding corporate debt).
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1999) (providing statutory information relating to
various causes of actions, each having different remedies and requiring
different elements, available to employees who invest in pension funds).
Typically, an employee attempts to recover monetary losses under § 1132 of
ERISA, which states in pertinent part that a suit can be brought:
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or fiduciary for appropriate
relief under section 409;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms
of the plan....
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)-(3).
66. See generally ERISA Litig. Rep., supra note 53, at 4 (offering a
discussion of the possible ways employees may recover ERISA contributions).
67. See, e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 253 (1993) (providing
an example of an employee using a statutory approach to bring a cause of
action to recover delinquent debt).
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delinquent payments from shareholders.6 However, as the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals stated,69 collecting outstanding pension
liability does not qualify as a determination or upholding of an
employee's rights under section 502.70 Courts consciously strive to
uphold Congress' original intent of preserving shareholder limited
liability for pension debt." Thus, courts remain skeptical of causes
of actions camouflaged as violations of specific ERISA provisions
that, in reality, seek to hold shareholders personally liable. 2 As a
result of this skepticism, courts created restrictions on imposing
liability on third parties.
2.

Court Imposed Restrictionson Third Party Liability

Without
evaluating
the
surrounding
circumstances,
employees cannot automatically impose liability for delinquent
pension obligations on shareholders just because the individual
invested in the corporation.73 Similarly, shareholders cannot incur
liability based solely on the number of shares or percentage of a
corporation they own. 7" A shareholder must exhibit extensive
control over the corporation to become responsible for pension
liability.75 Extensive control is determined by the application of
the economic reality test.76 The first element of this test is to
determine whether a limited number of individuals own the
company.77 The second element is to determine whether the

68. Id.
69. McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 108 (3d Cir. 1986).
70. See Sasso v. Cervoni, 985 F.2d 49, 50 (2d Cir. 1993) (supporting the
contention that shareholders must not incur liability to pay for ERISA
contributions). See generally McMahon, 794 F.2d at 108 (supporting the
appropriateness of a cause of action arising from the denial of an employee's
rights as set forth in the pension agreement).
71. See generally Sasso, 985 F.2d at 51 (inferring the apprehension of

imposing ERISA liability on shareholders).
72. See id. (suggesting that concrete evidence must be presented to impose

shareholder liability for delinquent debts).
73. See Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F. Supp. 295, 297-98 (M.D. Pa. 1987)
(discussing the correlation between an investor's ownership in a corporation
and responsibility for paying corporate debt).

74. Id.
75. See Rich Westphal, Comment, Employment Law - Imposing Individual
Liability to Simplify Collection and Discourage Delinquencies Under Section
1145 of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act: Massachusetts
Laborers' Health and Welfare Fund v. Starrett Paving Corporation, 15 J.

CORP. L. 135, 148-50 (1989) (discussing the relationship between the Federal
Labor Standard Act (FLSA) and ERISA, as well as the liability a shareholder
incurs for exerting dominance in a corporation comparable to that of an
employer).
76. Id. at 149.
77. Id. When the elements of the extensive control test are met, the
corporate veil is automatically pierced.

See generally id. (addressing the

consequences of being categorized as an employer because of the control the
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individuals who own the company also dominate the power and
dictate the exact functioning of the company.78
Only in the
extreme cases when an individual's actions within a corporation
reflect extensive control must the individual assume financial
responsibility for corporate obligations. 7 Since veil piercing is a
gray area of the law, reasons justifying veil piercing must also
exist.80

B. Reasons Justifying Veil Piercing
The courts' general apprehension to pierce the corporate veil
is quickly overcome if doing so advances the public's best interest."
Subsection One addresses a test and rationale used by courts to
impose liability on investors.
Subsection Two discusses the
liability imposed on individuals acting as fiduciaries. Subsection
Three examines policy reasons for piercing the corporate veil in an
ERISA context.
1.

A Test Designed to Impose Liability on a Shareholder

Despite the lack of authority not to hold third parties liable
for delinquent ERISA debt, a developing trend among the courts is
to impose liability on these persons.82 The trend is to adopt the

"liberal veil-piercing standard.'

This standard attempts to hold

shareholders liable for outstanding liabilities by completely
disregarding the corporate form as if limited liability did not
individual exerted over the corporation and the pension plan).

"[Stock

ownership, management, direction, and the operational control over the day to
day functions of the corporation" are considered in determining whether an
individual is actually an employer and therefore liable for unpaid corporate
claims. Id.
78. Westphal, supra note 75, at 149. See also Marc E. LeBlanc, ERISA's
Definition of 'Employer' and the Collection of Delinquent Multiemployer Benefit
Plan Contributions From Corporate Officers, 1987 DET. C.L. REv. 1, 23-24
(1987) (discussing and analyzing in detail the economic reality test and the
definition of employer).
79. See generally Westphal, supra note 75, at 145-46 (providing examples of
individuals who could be held liable for pension contributions due to their
positions in the corporation).
80. See Olthoff, supra note 35, at 328-29 (noting the inconsistency in
holdings in veil piercing cases).
81. See generally Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309,
1312 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that the corporate veil can be pierced to prevent
injustice). The courts' willingness to pierce the corporate veil in an ERISA
context is consistent with ERISA's purpose of also trying to advance the
public's best interest. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of ERISA and its
underlying policy.
82. David H. Barber, Piercingthe Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETrE L. REV.
371, 404 (1981).
83. See Roger C. Siske et al., What's New in Employee Benefits: A Summary
of Current Case and Other Developments, 17 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 37-41, 54 (1997)
(noting the adoption of liberal veil piercing tests by courts).
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exist." The rationale for holding a shareholder liable under this
test is that the shareholder exerted tremendous control on the
corporation sufficient enough to qualify the person as an
employere under ERISA.m The underlying justification for this
test is that a shareholder who has the freedom and power of
running a corporation must assume the risks associated with that
power.87
Courts implement the above analysis to hold shareholders
personally liable for pension debt.' For instance, the U.S. District
Court in the District of Massachusetts imposes responsibility for
pension liability on individuals who make important and
influential corporate decisions, especially those concerning the
pension plan. 89 When an individual steps beyond the boundary
line drawn that separates shareholders who are merely investors
from those who control the corporation, the individual becomes
Regardless of whether an
accountable for corporate debt.'
individual qualifies as an employer, an individual who defrauds a
plan becomes liable for the damages that result from the
fraudulent activity.9 Deception or injustice clearly justifies veil
piercing.'
Piercing the corporate veil occurs despite the detrimental
effect on the shareholder who, as a result, becomes liable for
Interestingly, courts more
outstanding corporate balances.93
readily allow piercing the corporate veil in contract cases,

84. See generally Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1514 (1st Cir. 1983)

(holding that individual liability is appropriate when the elements of the
extensive control test are met).
85. See supra note 60 for a definition of who qualifies as an employer under
ERISA.
86. ERISA Litig. Rep., supra note 53, at 5. See Scott A. Cammarn, Note,
InterpretingERISA: Corporate Officer Liability for Delinquent Contributions,

1986 DUKE L.J. 710, 714-21 (1986) (interpreting the meaning of employer);
Muir & Schipani, supra note 8, at 1104-05 (noting the difficulty of determining
who is an employer).
87. See generally ERISA Litig. Rep., supra note 53, at 5 (discussing the
additional responsibilities that an individual acting as an employer must
assume).

88. See Gambino v. Index Sales Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1450, 1455 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (addressing the justifications for holding individuals liable when they
directly control a corporation).
89. Massachusetts State Carpenters Pension Fund v. Atlantic Diving Co.,
635 F. Supp. 9, 13-14 (D. Mass. 1984).
90. See generally Gambino, 673 F. Supp. at 1455 (discussing the
responsibility imposed on individuals who control a corporation).
91. ERISA Litig. Rep., supra note 53, at 5.
92. Estate of Wallen v. Donat, 633 N.E.2d 1350, 1357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
93. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical
Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1056 (1991) (providing and analyzing the
results of a survey conducted to determine the frequency of veil piercing).
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premised on an ERISA violation, than they do in tort cases.9
Courts use the traditional veil piercing tests to determine
whether to hold a shareholder liable for delinquent ERISA
payments.95 The fundamental factors of these tests include: a
shareholder having complete control of the corporation; the
shareholder performing improper acts; and the shareholder's
improper acts harming a third party. 6 Courts consider these three
factors on a case-by-case basis.97
The recent trend is for courts to interpret broadly the three
factors comprising the veil piercing tests to provide employees
with the outstanding pension payments to which they are
entitled.98
For instance, a First Circuit decision held other
members of a brother-sister controlled group of corporations liable
for the pension debt of another bankrupt member in an attempt by
the court to ensure justice and fairness to employees. 99 The court
reasoned that enforcing limited liability is less important than
adhering to the employee protection policies encouraged by
ERISA.'00 A control group consists of a group of individuals in a
particular occupation that collectively exerts enough control over
the business to justify imposing financial liability. 11 Corporations
could continually escape the duty to pay pension plan liabilities if
shareholders who exert dominant control in corporate matters
were not held liable; such a result directly contradicts the policy of
ERISA. 0 2 Also, ERISA policy clearly provides that a fiduciary that
breaches the duties associated with that position can be held

94. Id. at 1058.
95. See Laborers' Pension Trust Fund v. Sidney Weinberger Homes, Inc.,
872 F.2d 702, 704-05 (6th Cir. 1988) (discussing the typical veil piercing
characteristics as they apply to causes of action involving pension plans);
Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 159 B.R. 814, 820 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993)
(finding that even though insufficient funding of a corporation is an essential
factor to consider, it alone will not justify piercing the corporate veil in an
ERISA context).
96. See supra note 34 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the
elements comprising the traditional veil piercing tests.
97. See Douglas J. Gardner, Comment, An Innovative Approach to Piercing
the Corporate Veil: An Introduction to the Individual Factor and Cumulative

Effects Analysis, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 563, 564-65 (1990) (addressing the
veil piercing tests that exist and how courts use them).
98. See generally Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d
1085, 1093 (1st Cir. 1983) (discussing the application of the veil piercing tests
in ERISA cases and the leniency in satisfying the tests).

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Gary Barnett, FundamentalPrinciplesand StructuringTechniques
in Domestic and Cross-Border Securitizations, 781 PRAC. L. INST. 1, 108-09
(1998) (providing general information about control groups); Muir & Schipani,

supra note 8, at 1103-04 (explaining the concept of common control).
102. Herr v. McCormick Grain - The Heiman Co., 841 F. Supp. 1500, 1516

(D. Kan. 1994).
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personally liable.' °
2. Liability Imposed on a Fiduciary
In certain situations, an employee can hold a shareholder
acting as a fiduciary"° of the plan liable for the pension's debt. °5
Deciding whether to hold a fiduciary liable involves asking if the
fiduciary sought outside advice and investigated other alternatives
before making a decision claimed to promote the pension plan's
purposes." If the fiduciary did not properly analyze the situation,
the accountability for any resulting loss or negative impact to the
plan rests with the individual."7
A fiduciary also incurs
103. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1999).
104. See id. (discussing a fiduciary's role in pension plans). A fiduciary is
defined as follows:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent[:]
(i) [H]e exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control
respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets,
(ii) lHie renders investment advice for a fee or other
compensation... with respect to any moneys or other property of
such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or
(iii) [H]e has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan.
Id. Fiduciaries of a pension plan must abide by certain specified standards
which are as follows:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) [Flor the exclusive purpose of:
(i) [Piroviding benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) [Diefraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) [W]ith the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(D) [I]n accordance with the documents and instruments governing
the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent
with the provisions of this subchapter ....
29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1999). See generally Galgay v. Gangloff, 677 F. Supp. 295,
302 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (describing Congress's intent regarding fiduciary
responsibility in general and breaches of that responsibility).
105. See, e.g., Laborers' Pension Fund v. Litgen Concrete Cutting & Coring
Co., 709 F. Supp. 140, 144 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (addressing the propriety of
imposing the responsibility to pay for pension liabilities on an individual who
acted as a fiduciary). See also Cammarn, supra note 86, at 725-26 (discussing
who is a fiduciary); Muir & Schipani, supra note 8, at 1106-07 (addressing the
rights employees have against a fiduciary who does not perform his duties).
106. See Siske et al., supra note 83, at 71 (referring to the factors used by
courts to assist in their determination of whether to hold individuals liable as
plan fiduciaries for pension obligations).
107. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that
a fiduciary incurs personal liability for failing to properly look after the
participants' interests in a pension plan).
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responsibility for corporate liabilities when plan funds are used to
pay personal debt instead of the required ERISA distributions.'O
Regardless of the circumstances, a fiduciary must act only in the
best interest of employees and the pension plan to avoid personal
liability. °9
Ethical considerations concerning pension fund
liability applies to all individuals dealing with pension plan
contributions, not just to a fiduciary.""
3. Ethical and Policy Reasons for Holding an IndividualLiable
for Pension Plan Debt
Courts hold a shareholder liable for accrued pension
payments that result from the shareholder's fraudulent
activities."' For instance, a shareholder's deliberate scheming to
conceal the number of hours employees worked in an attempt to
reduce the corporation's pension liability is sufficiently fraudulent
to warrant imposition of the pension deficit on the individual."' A
state's corporate law could also potentially impose liability on
individuals engaging in improper acts, even if they did not
contractually agree to the assumption of liability for any plan
deficits."'
However, even in the latter situation, shareholders
cannot incur liability when they explicitly deny such assumption
in the terms of the pension plan.
When shareholders violate the principles underlying limited
liability and ERISA, such violation offends the concept of justice
and courts accordingly hold the shareholders liable."' Individuals
"1

108. See Lowen v. Tower Asset Mgmt., Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir.
1987) (discussing the imposition of pension obligations on a fiduciary who
engaged in activities that ERISA prohibits).
109. ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW 19 (Susan P. Serota & Frederick A. Brodie eds.,
1995). The standard of acting only in the best interest of the participants in a
pension fund is also known as the "solely in interest" or "exclusive purpose"
test in ERISA law. Id.
110. See Leddy v. Standard Drywall, Inc., 875 F.2d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding a party other than a fiduciary liable for illegal activities associated
with a pension fund).
111. See id. (holding that a controlling corporate official who engages in
illegal activities associated with a pension fund is responsible for the resulting
harm, even if the traditional veil piercing conditions are not met).
112. Id. at 384.
113. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1194 (7th Cir. 1989).
See Romney v. Lin, 105 F.3d 806, 811 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that New York's
corporate law holds shareholders liable for employer's delinquent employee
benefit contributions).
114. See Levit, 874 F.2d at 1193 (stating that the responsibilities between
the parties of a pension plan are often dictated by the terms agreed to in the
plan).
115. See Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., 159 B.R. 814, 820 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1993) (presenting the plaintiffs argument that individuals cannot engage in
actions involving a pension fund which place employee distributions in
jeopardy).
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must assume responsibility to pay for debt in these situations
because ERISA strives to ensure that employees receive all earned
pension payments.10 Courts disregard the corporate form if doing
so protects employees and promotes the interests of justice." 7 Of
course, ERISA does not advocate holding shareholders liable for
delinquent pension funds if a suspicion of foul play exists without
providing sufficient proof to support the suspicion.1
If the corporate veil cannot be pierced, employees can attempt
to recover their benefits under a state's Wage Collection Statute."9
However, this cause of action is unlikely to succeed because the
federal court typically lacks jurisdiction over the state claim."
Also, unless the state's Wage Collection Statute is interpreted
broadly, recovery is difficult because ERISA preempts most state
laws. 2' If courts at a minimum use the same uniform criteria to
evaluate all veil piercing cases, employees could devise a
persuasive cause of action to recover delinquent pension
contributions. Such treatment would be in accordance with the
purposes underlying ERISA."2
III. AMENDING ERISA WOULD PROMULGATE ITS PURPOSE
Congress enacted ERISA to govern the operation of pension
funds.1" Since Congress did not include a provision in ERISA that
addresses corporate veil piercing, each court is forced to interpret
ERISA and conclude for itself the propriety of corporate veil
piercing. 2 Thus, decisions regarding corporate veil piercing for
ERISA purposes produce varied results." ERISA was enacted to

116. Id. at 819.
117. See generally Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising
Mgmt., Inc.,

519 F.2d 634, 638 n.4 (8th Cir. 1975) (discussing the

responsibility imposed on individuals to promote fairness and justice through
their actions).
118. See Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Lollo,
148 F.3d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that evidence of improper activities

must be presented to impose ERISA obligations on an individual).
119. See generally Laborers' Pension Fund v. Litgen Concrete Cutting &

Coring Co., 709 F. Supp. 140, 145 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (providing an example of an
employee using the Illinois' Wage Payment and Collection Act as a means to
impose shareholder liability).
120. See, e.g., id. (demonstrating the difficulty in establishing pendant party
jurisdiction where the federal court has dismissed all federal claims against
the party).

121. Id.
122. WOODRUFF, supra note 45, at 1-2.

123. Id.
124. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding
the avoidance of the veil piercing issue.
125. See supra notes 63-122 and accompanying text discussing the various

holdings and conclusions concerning the propriety of piercing the corporate
veil.
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create one uniform standard of regulations concerning employee
benefit plans throughout the nation.'28 If courts interpret the
statute differently in veil piercing situations, the underlying
purpose of ERISA is defeated.'27 Although veil piercing situations
require analysis on a case-by-case basis, consistency must exist in
the guidelines used by each court."
To make veil piercing holdings consistent, Congress needs to
amend ERISA to establish a guideline that explicitly details the
Such an amendment
circumstances permitting veil piercing.
However, this
would be in accordance with the spirit of ERISA.'
amendment should not purport to hold shareholders automatically'
contributions just because they
liable for delinquent ERISA
3
0
invested in the company.1

One of the criteria to be included in the proposed amendment
is to permit veil piercing when a shareholder engages in
fraudulent activity. 3' Shareholder withdrawal of funds from the
corporation in times of financial trouble for personal use, which
prevents the company from making the required ERISA
contributions, constitutes fraud and justifies veil piercing.' 3'

126. See generally Deborah S. Davidson, Note, Balancing the Interests of
State Health Care Reform and Uniform Employee Benefit Laws Under ERISA:
A "Uniform PatientProtectionAct," 53 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 203,
203-05 (1998) (providing an overview of the reasons why ERISA was enacted).
127. See Nash v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 946 F.2d 960, 964 n.8 (1st Cir.
1991) (stating that ERISA was established to promote uniformity in the
regulation of employee benefit plans).
128. Crane v. Green & Freedman Baking Co., 134 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1998).
Veil piercing in the ERISA context is a question of fact to be decided by a jury,
not a legal issue to be decided by a judge. Id.
129. See Davidson, supra note 126, at 203-05 (discussing the rationale
behind ERISA).
130. See Trustees of the Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension, Health & Annuity Funds
v. Hudson Serv. Corp., 871 F. Supp. 631, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (supporting the
contention that corporate officers are generally not liable for delinquent
contributions simply because of their relationship with and involvement in the
corporation).
131. See Crane, 134 F.3d at 23 (providing an example of an act that is
fraudulent under ERISA).
132. Id. Withdrawing funds for personal use also indicates the shareholder's
disrespect for the corporate entity, which is one element of the traditional
three-part test of piercing the corporate veil. Id. at 25. Any transfer of money
for personal use must be related to the company's inability to pay the pension
contributions before a court can hold a shareholder liable for corporate
obligations. Id. at 26. Thus, despite the general rule that shareholders are
not liable for corporate debt, specific situations exist where shareholders do in
fact incur liability. Hudson Serv. Corp., 871 F. Supp. at 638. An individual
who "(1) knowingly participat[es] in a fiduciary's breach of ERISA trust
obligations; (2) conspir[es] to divert ERISA funds for personal benefit; (3)
intermingl[es] personal and corporate assets; (4) engag[es] in fraudulent
conduct; or (5) where the individual is in fact the corporation or the
corporation's alter ego" is held accountable for corporate liabilities. Id.
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Although ERISA was enacted to protect pension contributions, an
employee cannot bring an action to recover delinquent
contributions if the contributions would have been illegal or if the
underlying agreement is void, because the employee's action would
be a form of fraud.' 3
In Trustees of the Building Service 32B-J Pension, Health &
Annuity Funds v. Hudson Service Corp.,"M the court adopted a twopart test and used it to determine whether shareholders are liable
for ERISA contributions when fraudulent activities are
suspected."= This two-part test consists of determining whether
the individual is a controlling figure in the corporate structure and
if elements of fraud are present." To provide a clear standard of
what conduct qualifies as fraud for ERISA purposes, Congress
should uniformly adopt this two-part test and incorporate it in the
amendment to ERISA.
Another criterion that Congress should include in the
amendment is to determine whether ignoring the corporate
identity and form would create an injustice.'37 The corporate form
is ignored when no distinction exists between corporate activities
and the individual's personal activities."3 In veil piercing cases,
acts that cause injustice include: (1) engaging in inappropriate
employment activities; (2) violating terms of a contract; (3)
engaging in activity that results in a tort; and (4) failing to satisfy
the financial obligations of a business.'
Congress should
uniformly adopt these criteria and incorporate them into ERISA.
Congress should provide explicit examples of each of the criteria to
prevent potential inconsistencies in courts' application of the tests.
Courts indicate that the satisfaction of one of criteria alone cannot
satisfy the injustice element, because at least one criteria, the
fourth one, is typically found in every veil piercing case.140
Allowing shareholders to escape liability by forming a fake
corporation that is purposely inadequately funded to avoid making
ERISA contributions is an injustice.
Injustice also occurs when
133. See Central Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund v. McCormick Dray Line, Inc.,
85 F.3d 1098, 1105-06 (3d Cir. 1996) (listing reasons an individual may use to

avoid pension liabilities).
134. 871 F. Supp. at 631.
135. See id. at 638 (providing an example of shareholder behavior that does
not acknowledge the separate existence of a corporation).

136. See id. (disclosing a test used by the courts to determine if an individual
acts as an employer).
137. See Environmental Dynamics, Inc. v. Robert Tyer & Assoc., 929 F.
Supp. 1212, 1235 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (stating that shareholders are liable for
delinquent corporate balances if no separation exists between their identities
and that of the corporation).
138. Id. at 1236.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See United States v. WNH Ltd. Partnership, 995 F.2d 515, 520 (4th Cir.

The John Marshall Law Review

[33:497

the purposes and policies of ERISA are deliberately violated.'42
Since courts find that these scenarios constitute injustices,
Congress should collectively adopt these scenarios in an
amendment to ensure uniformity and advancement of fairness
when veil piercing in ERISA contexts.
ERISA holds an employer liable for delinquent contributions,
but it does not expressly distinguish between an employer and a
shareholder.' 3 Under certain circumstances, courts hold that an
individual can be held liable as an employer, even if the individual
The
does not expressly recognize himself as an employer.'"
definition of employer under ERISA is overly broad and difficult to
apply in veil piercing situations.145 Anyone who makes vital
decisions affecting a pension plan is an employer under ERISA.'"
Congress needs to redefine the term employer and address the
specific circumstances under which a shareholder can incur
employer liability. To prevent future confusion, Congress must
also clearly define the responsibilities of other key members of a
corporation and address their potential liability for pension debt.
ERISA does not specifically allow an employee to bring a
cause of action to pierce the corporate veil.' 7 Some states have
For instance, a
enacted statutes to solve this problem."
Connecticut statute expressly imposes personal liability on
individuals when a civil cause of action is brought for delinquent
pension debt.1 9 However, an employee cannot establish a cause of
action based on a state statute alone because ERISA is a federal
statute that expressly preempts all state laws and statutes.
Although the Connecticut statute would resolve the problem of
collecting delinquent contributions by allowing a civil suit to
1993) (holding that commencing a business without adequate capital warrants
piercing the corporate veil).
142. See Michigan Carpenters Council Health & Welfare Fund v. C.J.
Rogers, Inc., 933 F.2d 376, 384-85 (6th Cir. 1991) (emphasizing that ERISA is

designed to safeguard employees' pension contributions).
143. See generally Taylor v. Carter, 948 F. Supp. 1290, 1296-99 (W.D. Tex.

1996) (discussing the different ways to interpret the word employer under
ERISA).
144. See generally id. (analyzing various holdings to conclude that
shareholders can qualify as employers).
145. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding
the meaning of the word employer.
146. See supra note 60 and accompanying text for a definition of the word
employer.
147. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of causes
of actions allowed under ERISA.
148. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Iversen, 925 F. Supp. 118, 120 (D. Conn. 1996)
(providing an example of a statute that permits employees to bring a cause of
action for delinquent pension payments).
149. Id. at 119.

150. See generally Barkdoll v. H & W Motor Express Co., 820 F. Supp. 410,
413 (N.D. Iowa 1993) (discussing ERISA preemption of state laws).
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collect the funds, it is expressly preempted by ERISA."5 However,
if a state has recognized the importance of providing an employee
with the ability to pierce the corporate veil, Congress should adopt
a similar practice by passing an amendment that would provide a
general means to allow employees to collect delinquent
contributions.'5 2 Amending ERISA would eliminate any confusion
regarding the propriety of veil piercing in ERISA contexts and
would enforce the spirit of ERISA in pension plans.
CONCLUSION
Pension plans are a vital part of America's corporate
employment structure'" and, thus, there is a need for Congress to
address the veil piercing issue and incorporate its conclusions in
ERISA.
Only when Congress has addressed the issue can
uniformity exist in pension plans. Such congressional action can
produce a uniform standard to ensure that the intent of ERISA
rings true in employee benefit plans."
M

151. Blackburn, 925 F. Supp. at 122.
152. See generally id. at 120 (supporting the contention that employees have
a right to seek compensation for delinquent contributions from key corporate
individuals).
153. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
importance of pension investing.
154. See supra notes 47 and 126 and accompanying text for a discussion of
ERISA's policies.

